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Abstract   
In this paper I analyse in how far the 2016 EU Global Strategy (EUGS) has changed the 
European Union (EU)’s approach towards multilateralism compared to the approach 
under its predecessor, the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS). I identify three major 
innovations: First, while the EUGS incorporates the EU’s long-standing commitment to 
‘effective multilateralism’, its approach of ‘effective global governance’ goes 
beyond that earlier approach and represents a qualitatively different concept. 
Second, the EUGS transcends the ESS in terms of emphasising the need to transform 
rather than just to preserve the multilateral system. Third, the EUGS neglects traditional 
‘strategic partnerships’ and expands the EU’s partnership approach towards 
engaging with a wider range of actors in a more pragmatic way. In a second step, I 
discuss the shortcomings of the new approach, which need to be addressed in the 
EUGS’s second year of implementation for which multilateralism has been chosen as 
a priority area. They include political and conceptual issues concerning the 
engagement with non-state actors and emerging powers as well as an unresolved 
dilemma in which individual EU member states must give up power to prevent the 
erosion of their collective influence and of the multilateral system at large.  
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Introduction: Revisiting the EU’s Approach towards Multilateralism 
Since the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS),1 the European Union (EU)’s “existential 
commitment to multilateralism”2 has been considered one of the main features of its 
foreign policy. It thus comes at little surprise that the ESS’s successor, the EU Global 
Strategy (EUGS) of June 2016, under the heading of “Global Governance for the 21st 
Century” incorporates multilateralism as one of its five priority areas.3 While not 
featured among the first round of priorities for the implementation of the EUGS, the 
Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) of July 2017 identifies “supporting global governance, in 
particular the United Nations” (UN) as an additional priority for 2017-2018.4 Against this 
background, I analyse in how far the EU’s approach towards multilateralism under the 
EUGS differs from that of the ESS and identify the shortcomings of the new approach. 
To that end, I undertake a comparative document analysis of the ESS and the EUGS, 
which is complemented by relevant academic literature and seven semi-structured 
interviews with practitioners and academics involved in the drafting of the EUGS’s 
provisions on multilateralism.5  
In stark contrast to the political salience reinforced by the FAC of July 2017 and 
to the considerable scholarly attention given to the EU’s approach towards 
multilateralism under the ESS, there is currently still a lack of a comprehensive analysis 
of the EU’s new approach under the EUGS. In addition to addressing this research gap, 
the relevance of the analysis of the EU’s evolving policy towards multilateralism is 
twofold: Practically, the EU and its member states are the biggest combined donor to 
the UN6 and potentially even “the principal and most powerful advocate[s] of 
multilateralism in the twenty-first century”.7 Academically, the EU’s “primordial, almost 
genetic” commitment to ‘effective multilateralism’ is a frequently found assumption 
                                                 
1 European Council, “European Security Strategy, A Secure Europe in a Better World” [hereafter, 
“ESS”], Brussels, 12 December 2003.  
2 C. Hill and J. Peterson, “Effective or Defective? Europe’s Experience of Multilateralism”, in: C. 
Bouchard, J. Peterson and N. Tocci (eds.), Multilateralism in the 21st Century: Europe's Quest for 
Effectiveness, London, Routledge, 2014, p. 70. 
3 EEAS, “Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe – A Global Strategy for the 
European Union's Foreign and Security Policy” [hereafter, “EUGS”], European External Action 
Service, Brussels, June 2016. 
4 Council of the European Union, “Outcome of the Meeting” [hereafter, “FAC July 2017”], 
11353/17, Brussels, 17 July 2017, p. 3.  
5 See the Bibliography for a list of interview partners.  
6 EU Delegation to the UN, About the EU at the UN. 
7 E. Lazarou et al., “The Evolving ‘Doctrine’ of Multilateralism in the Twenty-first Century”, in: C. 
Bouchard, J. Peterson and N. Tocci (eds.), Multilateralism in the 21st Century: Europe's Quest for 
Effectiveness, London, Routledge, 2014, p. 44. 
Sebastian Forsch 
5 
of research on the EU as a foreign policy actor 8 and is considered a doctrine guiding 
its foreign policy.9 The continued assessment of the EU’s changing approach towards 
multilateralism is thus important for understanding EU foreign policy in practical and 
academic terms as well as for the multilateral system at large.  
My analysis identifies three main areas in which the EUGS’s approach towards 
multilateralism differs from that of the ESS. First, the EUGS no longer talks about 
‘effective multilateralism’, but about ‘effective global governance’. While 
incorporating the EU’s long-standing commitment to the traditional multilateral 
institutions, ‘effective global governance’ goes beyond that earlier approach and 
represents a qualitatively different concept. Second, the EUGS transcends the ESS in 
terms of its ambition to transform rather than to just preserve the multilateral system. 
Finally, under the notion of ‘partnering’ the EUGS expands the EU’s partnership 
approach by emphasising the importance of engaging with a wider range of actors 
in a more pragmatic way.  
Based on these key findings, I argue that the biggest achievement of the EUGS 
is that it develops a consistent and new ‘meta-narrative’ of EU foreign policy in the 
form of ‘principled pragmatism’.10 This narrative is well translated into the Strategy’s 
approach towards multilateralism, which properly considers the changed global 
environment and the valid critique of ‘effective multilateralism’. However, I also 
identify several shortcomings of the EUGS’s approach towards multilateralism, 
including political and conceptual issues concerning the engagement with non-state 
actors and emerging powers as well as an unresolved dilemma that requires EU 
member states to give up power individually to maintain their collective influence and 
to prevent the erosion of the multilateral system at large. These shortcomings 
undermine the EU’s position to transform the multilateral system and to engage in new 
forms of partnerships. Consequently, they need to be considered in the upcoming 
elaboration and implementation of 2017-2018 and beyond. The three innovations also 
have important implications for the academic study of the EU in the multilateral 
system. They require, for instance, the reconsideration of the assumption that the EU 
unconditionally supports multilateral approaches.  
                                                 
8 Hill and Peterson, op. cit., p. 68. 
9 Lazarou et al., op. cit., p. 44. 
10 M. K. D. Cross, “The EU Global Strategy and Diplomacy”, Contemporary Security Policy, vol. 
37, no. 3, 2016, p. 403. 
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After a background section on the challenges of the multilateral system and 
the EU’s role in it, I analyse the ESS’s and the EUGS’s approach towards multilateralism 
and their follow-up and implementation. Subsequently, I discuss the EUGS’s 
innovations and their shortcomings, before drawing conclusions. 
 
Challenges to the Multilateral System 
Historically, multilateralism can be traced back to the post-1815 Concert of Europe of 
sovereign states and the rise of conference diplomacy in the 19th century. Following 
the breakdown of this system after World War I and the League of Nations’ failure to 
prevent World War II, the post-1945 world saw the creation of a previously unparalleled 
number of international organisations, including the UN system. This number kept 
increasing over the course of the second half of the 20th century in response to an 
accelerating process of globalisation and an increasing number of global 
challenges.11 Over the course of the 1990s, it became clear that what Van 
Langenhove refers to as state-focused “Multilateralism 1.0” was gradually transforming 
into a more open, contested and complex “Multilateralism 2.0”.12 This transformation 
was driven by the emergence of international non-state actors, new multilateral policy 
arenas and organisations and diverging conceptualisations of multilateralism. 
 The current multilateral system is confronted with three major challenges. First, 
there is a reinforcement of divergent understandings of the principles of multilateralism 
caused by the rise of emerging powers such as Brazil, India and China. While these 
countries are committed to multilateralism, they embrace principles different from 
those of the EU. According to Keukeleire and Delreux, emerging powers tend to strictly 
pursue their national interests in the form of unrestricted economic development.13 This 
clashes with the EU’s commitment to promoting global social, environmental and 
human rights standards. In terms of approach, emerging powers tend to prefer non-
binding agreements as well as consensus-oriented and intergovernmental decision-
making respecting national sovereignty, whereas the EU advances legally binding 
agreements with enforcement mechanisms restricting the contracting parties’ 
sovereignty. 
                                                 
11 Lazarou et al., op. cit., pp. 44-45. 
12 L. Van Langenhove, “The Transformation of Multilateralism: Mode 1.0 to Mode 2.0”, Global 
Policy, vol. 1, no. 3, 2010, pp. 263-270.   
13 S. Keukeleire and T. Delreux, The Foreign Policy of the European Union, Basingstoke, Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2014, 2nd edn., pp. 318-320.  
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 Second, the multilateral system faces the challenge of declining legitimacy. For 
many emerging powers and developing countries, this decline is linked to the system’s 
bias in favour of the principles and interests of the West.14 The multilateral system – 
exacerbated by the lack of reform in its principal bodies – has also lost legitimacy due 
to the perceived failure to deliver on many traditional challenges, such as 
international development and security. Furthermore, “[m]ost institutions are creations 
of the twentieth century and are therefore not necessarily suitable for the challenges 
of the twenty-first century”.15 
Finally, there is the challenge of fragmentation due to the establishment of 
alternative multilateral fora and institutions.16 The implications of such alternatives are 
ambivalent. On the one hand, “[t]he innovations in multilateral frameworks ensure the 
survival of multilateralism as an institution, despite the emergence of new powers”.17 
Moreover, they are potentially “more ‘effective’ in either solving collective problems 
or attracting the commitment of great powers”.18 On the other hand, these 
alternatives suffer from a lack of inclusiveness, legitimacy and predictability and the 
danger of replication.19  
 
The EU in the Multilateral System 
For Kaddous, the EU’s participation in the multilateral system is both a “functional 
necessity” and a “general aspiration”.20 The necessity stems from the need for external 
representation on issues on which the EU has common policies. The aspiration is the 
                                                 
14 J. Jokela, “The G-20: A Pathway to Effective Multilateralism?”, Chaillot Paper, European Union 
Institute for Security Studies, Paris, April 2011, pp. 56-57. 
15 K. E. Jørgensen, “One Size Fits All”, in: E. Drieskens and L. Van Schaik (eds.), The European 
External Action Service: Preparing for Success, Clingendael Papers, no. 1, Clingendael Institute, 
The Hague, December 2010, p. 21. 
16 For a discussion of four such alternatives under the umbrella of ‘minilateralism’, see R. N. 
Haass, “The Case for Messy Multilateralism”, Financial Times, 5 January 2010. 
17 K. V. Laatikainen, “EU Multilateralism in a Multipolar World”, in: K. E. Jørgensen and K. V. 
Laatikainen (eds.), Routledge Handbook on the European Union and International Institutions, 
London, Routledge, 2013, p. 484. 
18 Ibid. 
19 E. Moret, “Effective Minilateralism for the EU: What, When and How”, ISSUE Brief, no. 17, 
European Union Institute for Security Studies, Paris, June 2016, p. 2. 
20 C. Kaddous, “Introduction: The European Union in International Organisations – Functional 
Necessity or General Aspiration”, in C. Kaddous (ed.), The European Union in International 
Organisations and Global Governance: Recent Developments, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2015, 
p. 22. 
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result of the ideational commitment of the EU to multilateralism. Both necessity and 
aspiration are repeatedly expressed throughout the Lisbon Treaty.21  
The origin of this ideational commitment and aspiration is frequently associated 
with Europe’s historical experience of unbound nationalism and sovereignty 
culminating in two World Wars and the EU’s own nature as a highly institutionalised 
multilateral system. Therefore, scholars argue that “the EU’s commitment to a 
multilateral approach can be seen as part of its DNA”.22 Moreover, participation and 
external representation are essential components of exerting influence internationally, 
and due to its relative lack of hard power, a rules-based multilateral system is in the 
EU’s strategic interest.23 
As a result, “the EU has established close relationships and practical working 
methods to engage in the global governance architecture”.24 Its status in international 
organisations varies between full membership (e.g. at the World Trade Organisation 
[WTO]), observership (e.g. at the UN) and no representation (e.g. at the International 
Monetary Fund [IMF]). Some form of observer is the most frequent status.25 Beyond the 
legal dimension, the way in which the EU participates in practice differs from location 
to location.26 Politically “[m]any of the EU’s foreign policy actions are explicitly 
adopted alongside or in support of the initiatives of other international 
organizations”.27 Financially, the EU and its member states combined are the largest 
donor to the UN, amounting to the contribution of 30.38% to the regular UN budget, 
33.17% to the peacekeeping budget and to roughly 50% of all voluntary contributions 
to UN programmes and funds.28 
Nevertheless, the EU’s external representation is constrained by the membership 
provisions of international organisations and conventions, many of them restricting 
membership to states. If the EU can join an international organisation it is usually via a 
Regional (Economic) Integration Organisation (REIO/RIO) clause, but its rights tend to 
                                                 
21 Concerning the necessity, see the principles of conferral of powers (Article 5(2) TEU), sincere 
cooperation (Article 4(3) TEU), and consistency of external action (Article 21(3) TEU), and the 
provision on cooperation with international organisations (Article 221(1) TFEU). The aspiration is 
for instance expressed in Articles 21(1), 21(2) and 3(5) TEU.  
22 Keukeleire and Delreux, op. cit., p. 301. 
23 Jokela, op. cit., p. 56. 
24 Keukeleire and Delreux, op. cit., p. 299. 
25 Ibid., p. 302. 
26 See e.g. Kaddous, op. cit., for a comparative analysis of the EU in five major international 
organisations. 
27 Keukeleire and Delreux, op. cit., p. 299. 
28 EU Delegation to the UN, op. cit. 
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be inferior to those of member states. Furthermore, the EU’s own member states are 
usually parties in their own right, leading to a situation of mixed membership and the 
need for internal coordination.29  
Against the background of the state of the multilateral system and the EU’s 
position in it as provided above, the next section analyses the EU’s former approach 
towards multilateralism under the ESS.  
 
The European Security Strategy 
As embodied in the ESS’s opening sentence that “Europe has never been so 
prosperous, so secure nor so free”,30 the early 2000s were a particularly optimist time in 
the EU. This was due to the prospect of a Constitutional Treaty, the upcoming 
enlargement, and the overall impression that the world was looking at and admiring 
Europe.31 At the same time, however, the newly elected Bush administration’s National 
Security Strategy of 2002 declared the United States’ (US) readiness to engage in pre-
emptive war.32 Subsequently, the US-led ‘coalition of the willing’s’ disregard of the UN 
Security Council (UNSC) sparked controversy among, and eventually divided, the 
Europeans between member states supporting the intervention in Iraq and those 
opposing it.33 
It was in this context in May 2003 that the then German Foreign Minister Joschka 
Fischer informally proposed the idea of developing a strategy concept for Europe.34 
Via an intermediary report and backed by a Commission Communication,35 the then 
High Representative (HR) Javier Solana swiftly drafted what was to become the ESS 
with a small team and limited consultation.36 The ESS was formally adopted by the 
                                                 
29 P. J. Kuijper et al., The Law of EU External Relations: Cases, Materials, and Commentary on 
the EU as an International Legal Actor, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2015, 2nd edn., p. 170. 
30 European Council, ESS, op. cit., p. 1. 
31 J. Howorth, “EU Global Strategy in a Changing World: Brussels’ Approach to the Emerging 
Powers”, Contemporary Security Policy, vol. 37, no. 3, 2016, p. 390. 
32 The White House, “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America”, 
Washington, DC, September 2002.  
33 R. Kissack, Pursuing Effective Multilateralism: The European Union, International Organisations 
and the Politics of Decision-Making, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, p. 1. 
34 A. Missiroli (ed.), Towards an EU Global Strategy: Background, Process, References, European 
Union Institute for Security Studies, Paris, 2015, p. 13. 
35 European Commission, “The European Union and the United Nations: The Choice of 
Multilateralism”, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament, COM(2003) 526 final, 10 September 2003. 
36 Missiroli, Towards an EU Global Strategy, op. cit., p. 13. 
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European Council in December 2003.37 Considering the mixed record and limited 
scope of previous strategic planning in the realm of foreign policy, the ESS was 
regarded a “breakthrough”,38 which “marked the EU’s coming of age as a strategic 
actor”.39 
 
Approach towards Multilateralism 
The ESS identifies ‘An International Order Based on Effective Multilateralism’ as one of 
three strategy objectives, which, however, clearly stands out as the central one. For 
Biscop, ‘effective multilateralism’ summarises the two other strategic objectives: The 
first objective, ‘Addressing the Threats’, “can only succeed in the long-term through 
the root causes approach of Effective Multilateralism”, whereas the second one, 
‘Building Security in our Neighbourhood’, “is the application of the same principles in 
the proximity of the EU”.40 Thereby, and by constituting an objective in itself, 
“multilateralism is treated in the ESS both as an instrument and as a goal in a quest for 
the best means and concrete ends”.41 
The ESS defines ‘effective multilateralism’ as the “development of a stronger 
international society, well-functioning international institutions and a rule-based 
international order”.42 It is based on the principles of international law with the UN 
Charter and sovereign states at its core.43 The ESS’s overall message is that the 
multilateral system in post-World War II terms is fine and “unchallenged”.44 However, it 
is considered to be in need of strengthening if it is to be preserved and “to fulfil its 
responsibilities and to act effectively”.45 For this purpose, the ESS seeks to further 
develop and widen the membership of the traditional post-1945 international 
organisations  such as the UN and the international financial institutions (IFIs) and to 
                                                 
37 Council of the European Union, “Presidency Conclusions”, Brussels European Council, 12-13 
December 2003, 5381/04, Brussels, 5 February 2004, pp. 21-22. 
38 A. Missiroli, Strategy Matters, European Union Institute for Security Studies, Paris, July 2014, p. 
viii. 
39 M. Mälksoo, “From the ESS to the EU Global Strategy: External Policy, Internal Purpose”, 
Contemporary Security Policy, vol. 37, no. 3, 2016, p. 378. 
40 S. Biscop, “Effective Multilateralism: Bringing the European Way into Practice”, in: S. Biscop 
(ed.), “Audit of European Strategy”, Egmont Paper, no. 3, Egmont, Brussels, December 2004, p. 
27. 
41 Lazarou et al., op. cit., p. 51. 
42 European Council, ESS, op. cit., p. 10. 
43 Lazarou et al., op. cit., pp. 51-52. 
44 N. Tocci, “The Making of the EU Global Strategy”, Contemporary Security Policy, vol. 37, no. 
3, 2016, p. 464. 
45 European Council, ESS, op. cit., p. 9. 
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support the international organisations  newly created in the 1990s, such as the WTO 
and the International Criminal Court.46   
Despite this overwhelming commitment to universal multilateralism, the ESS 
states that regional organisations “also strengthen global governance”47 and 
considers them stepping stones for ‘effective multilateralism’. The same applies to 
‘strategic partners’.48 While no legal or procedural basis has been established since 
the term ‘strategic partnership’ was introduced in 1998,49 the ESS is the first document 
to name such partners,50 namely Canada, China, India, Japan, the US, Russia and “all 
those who share our goals and values, and are prepared to act in their support”.51 Yet, 
for Laatikanen, the ESS’s approach  
embraces two somewhat contradictory visions of international order; one 
premised upon a rule-based multilateral order supported by international 
institutions and rule of law, the other an explicitly political order wherein great 
powers jointly coordinate amongst themselves issues of bilateral and 
collective concern.52 
 
The appeal of ‘effective multilateralism’ as the ESS’s dominant theme is based on the 
achievement of embodying, addressing and reconciling several issues at the same 
time. In terms of foreign policy, ‘effective multilateralism’ was acceptable to all 
member states. By disassociating itself from the US’s unilateralism it also sharpened the 
EU’s international profile and identity.53 Internally, ‘effective multilateralism’ reconciles 
the European-integrationist countries, such as France and Germany, with the Atlantic 
camp, led by the United Kingdom. It does so by accommodating the integrationists’ 
more unconditional commitment to multilateralism and their initiative to upload it to 
the European level, “while qualifying such multilateralism as effective, thus allowing 
                                                 
46 Ibid., pp. 9-10. 
47 European Council, ESS, op. cit., p. 8. 
48 Ibid., p. 13. 
49 Council of the European Union, “Presidency Conclusions”, Vienna European Council, 11-12 
December 1998, 00300/1/98 REV, p. 9. 
50 C.-C. Cîrlig, “EU Strategic Partnerships with Third Countries”, Library Briefing, Brussels, Library of 
the European Parliament, 120354REV1, 26 September 2012, pp. 1-2. 
51 European Council, ESS, op. cit., pp. 13-14. 
52 K. V. Laatikainen, “EU Multilateralism in a Multipolar World”, in: K. E. Jørgensen and K. V. 
Laatikainen (eds.), Routledge Handbook on the European Union and International Institutions, 
London, Routledge, 2013, p. 472. 
53 R. Kissack, “The European Union and Multilateralism”, in: K. E. Jørgensen and K. V. Laatikainen 
(eds.), Routledge Handbook on the European Union and International Institutions, London, 
Routledge, 2013, p. 407. 
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the (…) ‘Atlantic’ member states to give Washington a nod and a wink”.54 
Furthermore, ‘effective multilateralism’ serves as a unifying framework embracing 
many EU foreign policy objectives mentioned in the ESS, such as good governance, 
the rule of law and human rights.55 
 In the following section I examine the ESS’s implementation and development 
over time followed by an overview of its academic assessment.  
 
Policy and Institutional Developments 
The ESS was considered an “unqualified success” in terms of re-establishing political 
unity and saving the EU foreign policy project after the division over Iraq.56 Yet, despite 
its strategic outlook, the ESS’s policy implications along the lines of “more active, 
capable, and coherent” are fairly broad and no means of implementation were 
subsequently specified in greater detail. According to Missiroli, “it was HR Solana 
himself who preferred to keep the ESS as a general ‘doctrine’ and resisted calls to 
translate it into a series of detailed action plans”.57 As a result, for Tocci, the ESS “was 
only partially a strategy”.58   
After the failure to ratify the Constitutional Treaty in 2005, the Lisbon Treaty 
entered into force in December 2009. Despite some drawbacks compared to the 
provisions of the Constitutional Treaty, Lisbon signalled the EU’s ambition to become a 
more active and recognised international player.59 It brought about important 
innovations such as the creation of the double-hatted HR/VP, the foundation for the 
subsequent creation of the EEAS and the upgrade of the ESDP to the CSDP.60 For 
Gstöhl, however, due to the lack of internal and external political support, the Lisbon 
Treaty’s innovations “remedy the shortcomings of EU multilateral diplomacy only to a 
limited degree (…) [and] do not necessarily lead to more effective multilateralism”.61 
                                                 
54 N. Tocci, “Towards an EU Global Strategy”, in: A. Missiroli (ed.), Towards an EU Global Strategy: 
Background, Process, References, European Union Institute for Security Studies, Paris, 2015, p. 
116. 
55 Kissack, The European Union and Multilateralism, op. cit., p. 407. 
56 Missiroli, Towards an EU Global Strategy, op. cit., p. 15. 
57 Missiroli, Strategy Matters, op. cit., p. ix. 
58 Tocci, Towards an EU Global Strategy, op. cit., p. 119. 
59 E. Drieskens, “Introduction: A Framework for Analysing Effective Multilateralism”, in: E. 
Drieskens and L. Van Schaik (eds.), The EU and Effective Multilateralism: Internal and External 
Reform Practices, London, Routledge, 2014, p. 1.  
60 Keukeleire and Delreux, op. cit., p. 57. 
61 S. Gstöhl, “EU Diplomacy After Lisbon: More Effective Multilateralism?”, Brown Journal of 
World Affairs, vol. 17, no. 2, 2011, p. 182. 
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 One day after the Lisbon Treaty was signed, in December 2007, the European 
Council tasked Solana to “examine the implementation” of the ESS.62 The resulting 
Report “largely repeated the contents of the strategy [the ESS], with only some small 
innovations”.63 Concerning multilateralism, it re-iterated the centrality of ‘effective 
multilateralism’ as the framework of the EU’s external action. Yet, by stating that 
“Europe must lead a renewal of the multilateral order”64 it went beyond the ESS in 
terms of recognising the urgency and degree of change required. This can be seen 
as a response to the stated recognition that “globalisation is accelerating shifts in 
power and is exposing differences in values”.65 However, the Report lacked the buy-
in of member states which were soon divided over whether or not to come up with a 
comprehensive new strategy.66  
 Institutionally, the establishment of the EEAS, which was formally launched in 
January 2011, was a major breakthrough that followed from the Lisbon Treaty.67 For 
Biscop, the creation of the EEAS and other institutional reforms of the Lisbon Treaty are 
closely related to the ESS and its call for ‘effective multilateralism’ as they are required 
“for the elaboration of integrated [external] policies to be at all possible”.68 However, 
the subsequent attempt to upgrade the EU’s status at the UN General Assembly 
(UNGA) in order to reflect the Lisbon Treaty’s enhanced provisions on external 
representation initially failed and a resolution was only adopted with less participation 
rights in May 2011.69 Moreover, the implementation of the UNGA resolution has been 
challenging and the trickle down of the EU’s enhanced status at the UNGA to other 
UN bodies did not materialise as expected.70 A strategy paper “for the progressive 
improvement of the EU status in international organisations and other fora in line with 
                                                 
62 Council of the European Union, “Presidency Conclusions”, Brussels European Council, 14 
December 2007, 16616/1/07, Brussels, 14 February 2008, p. 24. 
63 Keukeleire and Delreux, op. cit., p. 55. 
64 European Council, “Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy – 
Providing Security in a Changing World”, Council, S407/08, Brussels, 11 December 2008, p. 2. 
65 Ibid., p. 1. 
66 Keukeleire and Delreux, op. cit., p. 55. 
67 Council of the European Union, “Council Decision (2010/427/EC) of 26 July 2010 Establishing 
the Organisation and Functioning of the European External Action Service”, Official Journal of 
the European Union, L 201/30, 3 August 2010. 
68 Biscop, Effective Multilateralism, op. cit., p. 31. 
69 United Nations General Assembly, “Resolution 65/276, Participation of the European Union in 
the Work of the United Nations”, A/RES/65/276, 3 May 2011. 
70 J. Wouters, A.-L. Chané and J. Odermatt, “Improving the EU’s Status in the UN and the UN 
System: An Objective Without a Strategy?”, Working Paper, no. 133, Leuven Centre for Global 
Governance Studies, Leuven, March 2014, pp. 8-9. 
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the objectives of the Treaty of Lisbon”71 was presented by the Commission in 2012, but 
also experienced limited success. For Wouters, Chané and Odermatt this so-called 
Barroso-Ashton Strategy “lack[ed] the required level of vision and precision, and [wa]s 
thus inadequate for guiding the EU’s efforts towards assuming its desired leadership 
role at the UN level”.72  
 
Academic Assessment 
Overall, “[t]he 2003 ESS triggered massive academic interest, including an entire 
‘generation’ of PhD dissertations in political science, international relations and 
European studies”.73 The overall academic assessment of ‘effective multilateralism’ in 
conceptual and practical terms is mixed. Conceptually, all interviewees confirmed 
that ‘effective multilateralism’ has continued to resonate well with EU diplomats and 
practitioners. Lazarou et al. go even further and argue that “the use of multilateralism 
as a focal point in EU foreign policy may be perceived as constituting an evolving 
doctrine”.74  
However, ‘effective multilateralism’ remains elusive as a term and is interpreted 
in different ways by different actors. This is illustrated by the extensive academic 
discussion of ‘effective multilateralism’ as a concept, which has found “little 
agreement on what this exactly entails”.75 Therefore, for Keukeleire and Delreux, “the 
meaning of ‘effective multilateralism’ seems to have been eroded”.76 Bouchard, 
Peterson and Tocci argue that the tension between the simultaneous promotion of 
‘effective multilateralism’, regionalism and ‘strategic partnerships’ remains unresolved, 
too.77 Furthermore, they point out that the EU, for instance at the WTO, “also vigorously 
defends European interests within international organisations (…), at times in line with 
the broader goals of the multilateral grouping in question, at times not”.78 
 Practically, Ujvari argues that ‘effective multilateralism’ in the form of supporting 
“legally binding commitments agreed upon by the largest number of nations possible 
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through strong multilateral institutions has (…) fallen short of defining international 
relations of the past decade”.79 Indeed, in most other areas of global governance, 
with the potential exception of climate, the trend has rather been towards more 
bilateralism or minilateralism. Examples are the fields of development and trade in 
which regional and parallel structures have proliferated.80  
Concerning the ESS’s ambition to contribute to the reform of multilateral 
institutions, according to Drieskens and Van Schaik, the “empirical picture (…) is one 
of mixed success”:81 While there is extensive evidence for the operationalisation of 
‘effective multilateralism’, the EU and its member states predominantly “stayed away 
from high-level commitments on substantial reform and concentrated their efforts on 
procedural, administrative and technical issues”.82 In addition, the EU, and with it 
‘effective multilateralism’, has lost relative appeal over the past ten years,83 for 
instance due to the financial crisis; the disappointing response to the Arab Spring; and 
the increasingly apparent “gap between the EU’s self-perception as a ‘positive 
power’ and the way it is perceived in other parts of the world”.84 This is illustrated by 
the fact that the strategy of ‘leading by example’, the origin of which can partly be 
traced back to the ESS, has for long been untenable.85  
 
The EU Global Strategy 
In addition to the ongoing pressure by some member states to replace the ESS, it was 
in the context of an exacerbated security environment that the European Council 
agreed to invite the HR/VP in December 2013 “to assess the impact of changes in the 
global environment”.86 Upon her appointment as HR/VP in July 2014, Federica 
Mogherini quickly expressed the need for a “strategic rethink” in EU foreign policy.87 
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Her strategic assessment for the European Council stated that “[w]e need a common, 
comprehensive and consistent EU global strategy”.88 By 2015, the security context had 
further deteriorated and the strategic assessment painted the picture of an “arc of 
instability” surrounding the EU and of a “more connected, contested and complex 
world”.89 As a result, member states eventually agreed in June 2015 to task Mogherini 
to produce a new “global strategy on foreign and security policy”.90  
For Tocci, it was clear that “a process of strategic reflection for the EU in 2015-
2016 could look nothing like what it did back in 2003”.91 Instead, it had to be more 
inclusive and action-oriented. The process consisted of a “public outreach and 
consultation” dimension with a dedicated website,92 50 events across and outside the 
EU and written expert opinions93 as well as of an “official and institutional” dimension 
which involved member states via dedicated national points of contact and the 
Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER).94 In terms of scope, the EUGS’s 
ambition was to be global geographically and policy-wise, thus being more than a 
security strategy and incorporating the full spectrum of the EU’s external action. This 
reflects Mogherini’s double-hatted HR/VP role and the evolution of the EU’s foreign 
policy instruments, competences and capabilities since 2003.95  
The EUGS’s first chapter specifies the foreign policy interests of the EU as peace 
and security, prosperity, democracy and “a rules-based global order”.96 Its second 
chapter defines the principles of the EU’s external action: unity, engagement, 
responsibility and partnership. It also introduces ‘principled pragmatism’ as the EUGS’s 
new ‘meta-narrative’ guiding the EU’s external actions, which “seeks to move the 
debate away from false dichotomies and well known hypocrisies (…) [e.g.] on 
‘interests versus values’”97 and recognises the limits of ‘leading by example’. Together, 
the first two chapters form the Strategy’s bedrock and develop the narrative which is 
subsequently translated into the third chapter on the priorities of the EU’s external 
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action. These priority areas are: The Security of our Union, State and Societal Resilience 
to our East and South, an Integrated Approach to Conflicts and Crises, Cooperative 
Regional Orders, and Global Governance for the 21st Century.98 The final chapter 
entitled “From Vision to Action” makes the case for a more credible, responsive and 
joined-up Union.99  
The next section analyses the EUGS’s approach towards multilateralism and 
examines how it fits within the broader content of the document as outlined above.  
 
Approach towards Multilateralism 
The sub-chapter “Global Governance for the 21st Century” starts off with the re-
affirmation of the ESS’s commitment to “a strong UN as the bedrock of the multilateral 
rules-based order”.100 The remainder of the sub-chapter is structured along seven 
issues, which jointly constitute the EUGS’s approach towards achieving its vision of 
global governance: reforming, investing, implementing, deepening, widening, 
developing and partnering. 
There are several important inter-linkages with other sections that embed the 
sub-chapter on global governance within the EUGS at large. First, there is the interest 
in “A Rules-Based Global Order” as set out in the first chapter. It states that “[a]s a 
Union of medium-to-small sized countries, we have a shared European interest in 
facing the world together”.101 This interest, in turn, is linked to the principle of ‘unity’ 
and recognises that, unlike partners such as the US, the EU does not have the luxury 
not to be committed to multilateralism.102 By further stating that “[a] multilateral order 
grounded in international law (…) is the only guarantee for peace and security at 
home and abroad”,103 the indispensability of a rules-based global order is reinforced 
and explicitly linked to the interest in peace and security.  
The key principles of the EUGS that are relevant for its approach towards 
multilateralism are particularly those of ‘responsibility’ and ‘partnership’.104 The section 
on responsibility begins by stating that “[i]n a more contested world, the EU will be 
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guided by a strong sense of responsibility”.105 Moreover, it says that “[w]e will take 
responsibility foremost in Europe and its surrounding regions, while pursuing targeted 
engagement further afield”.106 This conceptualisation of responsibility is very much a 
reflection of ‘principled pragmatism’, which acknowledges the normative 
component of the commitment to a rules-based global order, but also recognises the 
limits of what the EU is capable of doing globally. In the partnership section, the EUGS 
further qualifies the EU’s responsibility by stating that “responsibility must be shared and 
requires investing in our partnerships”.107  
 In the following, I identify and analyse three main areas in which the EUGS’s 
approach towards multilateralism innovates and differs from that of the ESS.  
 
Innovation 1: Effective Global Governance 
One of the most striking observations is that the EUGS does not mention ‘effective 
multilateralism’ anymore. Instead, it talks about ‘effective global governance’. Yet, all 
interview partners confirmed that this does not imply a complete departure away from 
multilateralism. Rather, ‘effective global governance’ is a broader term that comprises 
‘effective multilateralism’ and its established notions of ‘investing’ in traditional 
international organisations, particularly the UN; working towards ‘implementing’ 
multilateral commitments; ‘deepening’ existent rules; and ‘widening’ the reach of 
norms and membership of international organisations.108 
However, the term ‘effective global governance’ also recognises the limits of 
multilateralism and the need for more flexibility in working with different groups and 
types of partners in different formats if the issue at stake so requires.109 This entails 
actions that go beyond the ESS, namely a more urgent call for ‘reforming’ (and even 
‘transforming’) multilateral institutions.110 What is more, the EUGS adds the new notions 
of ‘developing’ governance in under-regulated fields such as cyber, artificial 
intelligence, health, biotechnology, energy, robotics and remotely piloted systems;111 
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and of ‘partnering’ “with states and organisations, but also with the private sector and 
civil society” via formats that “may vary from case to case”.112  
In this sense, ‘effective global governance’ is a translation of ‘principled 
pragmatism’ into the realm of multilateralism. By starting to look at the issue at stake 
and only subsequently considering which actors and mechanisms or governance 
arrangements are required to address it, the approach is more pragmatic in the sense 
of issue-driven and problem-oriented.113 For Ujvari, this is “a stark contrast with the ESS’s 
approach of ‘promoting rule-making in a top-down fashion through formal global 
institutions’”,114 which was more principled.  
The interviews revealed that the principled and at the same time pragmatic 
approach of ‘effective global governance’ also reflects a political compromise 
between member states defending a more traditional ‘UN first’ approach (e.g. 
Austria, Ireland and Sweden) and others (such as France and Germany) as well as the 
HR/VP herself, who were open towards a more flexible, bottom-up approach based 
on local ownership. The arguments exchanged on this issue reflected the debate 
around preventing a further destabilisation of the already extensively challenged UN 
system versus not closing the doors to new actors and formats.115  
All interview partners, however, emphasised the importance of bringing 
solutions found outside the established multilateral system back to it, thus using 
minilateral agreements as building blocks for the multilateral level. Successful 
examples referred to are the Iran nuclear deal and the Minsk II Agreement.  
 
Innovation 2: Transformation of the Multilateral System 
Overall, the language on reform that found its way into the EUGS is fairly bold. As 
opposed to the ESS, the EUGS’s commitment to the UN at the heart of the multilateral 
system “translates into an aspiration to transform rather than simply preserve the 
existing system”.116 Additionally, it states that “the EU will aspire to play a leading role 
in supporting the emergence of multilateral governance notably in areas like cyber 
security, digital economy, space or health”.117 
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More specifically, the section on ‘reforming’ states that a commitment to 
‘effective global governance’ entails the necessity to reform bodies such as the UN, 
the UNSC, and the IFIs as “[r]esisting change risks triggering the erosion of such 
institutions and the emergence of alternative groupings to the detriment of all EU 
Member States”.118 This is a new message and strong wording – particularly when 
considering that some EU member states have become members of such alternative 
institutions, for instance the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), themselves. 
While the ESS’s focus was on consolidating traditional IFIs, “the EUGS does not even 
seem to take their central role as given any more”.119 Instead, it recognises the 
challenges of multipolarity, declining legitimacy and fragmentation of the multilateral 
system, and urges these institutions to change if their influence and EU member states’ 
disproportionally high share of it is to be maintained. For the EU itself, the priorities for 
reform are “strengthen[ing] its voice and acquir[ing] greater visibility and cohesion” at 
the UN and IFIs as well as “work[ing] towards an increasingly unified representation of 
the euro area in the International Monetary Fund”.120  
While there was a consensus on the need to make the multilateral system more 
effective, some parties called for a language that would have been even stronger 
than ‘transforming’ the existing system. Others cautioned that the EU has not only 
benefitted from, but has also been instrumental in building up the multilateral system. 
This included moving it beyond national interests and state sovereignty, which, from 
the EU’s perspective, is regarded a considerable advancement that should not be 
jeopardised.121  
Another controversial issue was that of the representativeness of the existent 
system. Again, there was a consensus among member states on the general direction, 
namely that for the multilateral system to persist, the legitimate aspirations of emerging 
powers, which did not yet feature prominently on the agenda in 2003, had to be 
recognised.122 However, it would have been politically impossible to specify any 
modalities for reform or to state explicitly that, in order to individually do so, EU member 
states had to give up power.123 Instead, the EUGS merely highlights the EU’s 
commitment to the generic principles of “accountability, representativeness, 
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responsibility, effectiveness and transparency” and qualifies this commitment with the 
elusive statement that “[t]he practical meaning of such principles will be fleshed out 
case-by-case”.124 
 
Innovation 3: Partnering 
More pragmatism and flexibility than in 2003 also characterise the EUGS’s approach 
towards the partners with whom ‘effective global governance’ is to be achieved. This 
is embodied in the central term of ‘partnering’, which recognises the need for 
partners, but provides considerable room for defining who these partners are. Overall, 
the need for partner(s)/partnership(s) receives a more prominent role in the EUGS 
(mentioned 73 times) than in the ESS (mentioned 11 times).125  
Recognising the limits of what the EU can do on its own to address transnational 
challenges, the section on partnership identifies ‘co-responsibility’ as the Union’s 
“guiding principle in advancing a rules-based global order”.126 Additionally, it is stated 
that  
[w]e will partner selectively with players whose cooperation is necessary to 
deliver global public goods and address common challenges. We will 
deepen our partnerships with civil society and the private sector as key actors 
in a networked world. We will do so through dialogue and support, but also 
through more innovative forms of engagement.127 
 
These three sentences are a key innovation reflecting the EUGS’s focus on ‘principled 
pragmatism’ and ‘effective global governance’. They represent a clear departure 
from the ESS’s more principled, universalist, state-focused and formalised approach 
towards partnerships. For instance, instead of only partnering strategically with those 
entities “who share our goals and values”,128 the EU now recognises the necessity to 
engage with those actors “whose cooperation is necessary”. Furthermore, the EUGS is 
the first official EU foreign policy document that grants such extensive attention to the 
need to collaborate with non-state actors in global governance. These include civil 
society (mentioned 22 times), the private sector (mentioned ten times), and public-
private partnerships (mentioned three times).  
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 Even within the sovereignty-based realm of states, regional organisations and 
international organisations, the range of partners explicitly mentioned in the EUGS is 
much broader than that of the ESS, which had an “overwhelming emphasis on the 
United States, NATO and a handful of other regional organisations”.129 Next to a total 
of eight international organisations that were not mentioned in the ESS, the EUGS also 
refers to a wider range of partner countries, including Indonesia, Iran, the Republic of 
Korea and Turkey.130 This reflects the increased multipolarity, fragmentation and 
importance of regional powers and regions in the multilateral system, which the EUGS 
recognises as “critical spaces of governance in a de-centred world”.131  
 Additionally, the EUGS has a very different take on ‘strategic partnerships’ and 
implicitly codifies an already ongoing process of overhauling the EU’s approach 
towards these partnerships.132 This reflects that they are largely deemed ineffective 
and “rather a goal to be pursued (…) than a reflection of reality”.133 The number of 
‘strategic partnerships’ has grown considerably since the ESS provided a first indication 
and is considered to include ten bilateral strategic partnerships.134 While being highly 
heterogeneous in nature,135 all strategy partnerships tend to follow a very formalistic, 
institutionalised and long-term oriented pattern, including sectoral dialogues, 
ministerial meetings and annual summits.136  
Against this background, the EUGS uses the term ‘strategic 
partner(s)/partnership(s)’ more loosely and only three times.137 For Howorth, “it is telling 
that the EUGS effectively reduces the relationship with these [emerging/strategic] 
powers to one dominated by the quest for global governance”.138 When referring to 
NATO, the UN and the US, the EUGS even avoids the label of ‘strategic partnership’ 
and talks instead of “core partners”.139 Thus, with the introduction of the term 
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‘partnering’, the EUGS moves away from the “rhetorical façade”140 of overly 
institutionalised ‘strategic partnerships’ which have failed to become stepping stones 
for ‘effective multilateralism’ towards a more pragmatic and flexible approach. With 
the potential exception of the more limited number of ‘core partners’, this new 
approach does not per se privilege any partner over another.141  
 In the next section I analyse the preliminary implementation and political 
reception of the EUGS.  
 
Implementation 
Due to the shockwaves of Brexit only five days before, the EUGS did not attract much 
attention following its submission to the European Council in June 2016. The European 
Council in a single sentence "welcome[d] the presentation” of the EUGS.142 Yet, as 
opposed to the ESS, the EUGS contains specific and systematic provisions on its 
implementation. The latter consists of three components: first, the revision of existent 
and the design of new sectoral and geographic strategies in line with the EUGS; 
second, a yearly revision of the EUGS and its priorities for implementation; and third, 
the launch of “a new process of strategic reflection (…) whenever the EU and its 
member states deem it necessary”.143  
 The priorities for implementation for the first year, endorsed by the FAC in 
October 2016, focused on building resilience in the neighbourhood, an integrated 
approach to conflicts and crises, and a joined-up Union, thus enhancing synergies 
between external and internal policies.144 A report on the implementation of the EUGS 
in these areas was presented to the FAC in June 2017145 and depicts the Strategy as 
“a springboard to relaunch the process of European integration after the British 
referendum”.146  
Finally, next to cooperative regional orders, the July 2017 FAC identified 
multilateralism as an additional priority for implementation in the second year of the 
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EUGS in 2017-2018. The implementation is supposed to focus on “supporting global 
governance, in particular the United Nations”, the Paris Agreement, the Sustainable 
Development Goals, nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament as well as cyber 
security.147 The same FAC meeting also approved the EU’s priorities at the UNGA for 
2017-2018.148 The document largely echoes the EUGS’s provisions on multilateralism 
and might become an important source of reference for its upcoming 
implementation, too. It states that “multilateralism is the most powerful tool that we 
have in our hands” and that “[t]he UN remains the lynchpin of our global 
engagement”.149 
 
Discussion of the Innovations under the EU Global Strategy 
The comparative analysis of the EU’s approach towards multilateralism revealed three 
main innovations under the EUGS compared to the ESS: (1) the promotion of ‘effective 
global governance’ (rather than of ‘effective multilateralism’); (2) the ambition to 
transform the multilateral system (rather than to preserve it); and (3) the inclusive 
concept of ‘partnering’ (rather than the selective engagement with a small number 
of like-minded states and traditional international organisations). Below, I critically 
discuss these three innovations and identify their shortcomings.   
 
Innovation 1: From Effective Multilateralism to Effective Global Governance 
As outlined in the previous section, the EUGS’s notion of ‘effective global governance’ 
builds on the ESS and ‘effective multilateralism’, but is an expanded and qualitatively 
different concept. The qualitative difference between the two concepts becomes 
apparent when considering how multilateralism and global governance are 
commonly conceptualised in the academic literature. “While striking deals through 
universal institutions certainly remains the EU’s preferred approach”,150 the EUGS 
advances a case-by-case approach, which potentially disregards what is commonly 
regarded the bedrock of multilateralism, namely, generalised principles of conduct, 
indivisibility and diffuse reciprocity.151 Instead, it seeks to make use of the full range of 
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“institutions, regimes, processes, partnerships, and networks that contribute to 
collective action and problem solving at the international level”152 that jointly 
constitute global governance. This is a stark contrast to the ESS for which multilateralism 
means quite the opposite, namely “that international issues are preferably not dealt 
with case by case”.153 In this sense, for the ESS ‘effective multilateralism’ is both means 
and end, whereas for the EUGS ‘effective global governance’ is the new means and 
‘effective multilateralism’ becomes a component of a rules-based global order as one 
among several ends. 
 Nevertheless, next to the ongoing preference for formal multilateralism, the EU 
also seeks to multilateralise agreements reached differently or informally a posteriori. 
This comes close to the dual system of formality and informality that Penttilä refers to 
as “multilateralism light”.154 This multilateralism is based on a division of labour 
according to which “informal organisations are increasingly responsible for the process 
of solving problems while formal organisations concentrate on legitimising the 
results”.155 For Penttilä, this is an irreversible and positive development as it allows for 
bringing together the relevant actors to address a particular issue at hand and for 
integrating emerging powers into global governance.156  
 Yet, there are also downsides to the shift away from the ESS’s more universalist 
approach. A potential danger is that of ‘forum shopping’, whereby great powers will 
only selectively engage in those fora that best serve their interests. Thereby, they might 
play off smaller states or institutions against each other. Instead of increasing the 
predictability of global governance and taming powerful actors, the more flexible use 
of multilateral institutions as advocated for by the EUGS might thus exacerbate the 
existing challenges of multipolarity, legitimacy and fragmentation and negatively 
affect the multilateral system at large.157 Furthermore, the abandonment of ‘effective 
multilateralism’ as one of the most well-established and recognised concepts of EU 
foreign policy might have negative consequences from a strategic point of view by 
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confusing allies or negatively affecting the EU’s image as an unconditional supporter 
of multilateralism.158  
 ‘Effective global governance’ is also a reflection of the EUGS’s shift towards 
‘principled pragmatism’ as a new meta-narrative of EU foreign policy. However, in 
many regards this shift is not such a radical innovation as it might appear at first sight. 
Indeed, the recognition that the EU is and should not only be a normative power goes 
back at least to the Lisbon Treaty, which marked the EU’s ambition to become a more 
internationally recognised player.159 Moreover, it is the result of the gradual and 
reluctant recognition that the internal, regional and global environment has become 
more hostile compared to 2003 and that the EU is no longer – if it ever was – in a 
position to inspire and teach others how to be a responsible international player.160 
Concerning multilateralism, the shift towards ‘effective global governance’ has been 
a long process of eventually overcoming a long-standing “existential” attitude at the 
UN characterised by “much-needed recognition of the EU, its unique state of 
integration and contributions to global issues” rather than that of a constructive 
contributor.161 Consequently, ‘principled pragmatism’ and ‘effective global 
governance’ are conceptually and logically consistent codifications and 
reinforcements of developments in EU foreign policy over the past decade.  
 
Innovation 2: From Preserving to Transforming the Multilateral System 
The EUGS clearly goes beyond the 2003 ESS and its 2008 implementation report in terms 
of emphasising the need to transform instead of preserving or merely reforming the 
multilateral system. It also seeks to enhance the EU’s representation in international 
organisations and to establish mechanisms for global governance in areas deemed 
under-regulated.  
However, these considerably bold ambitions come without much substance or 
concrete examples. Thus, it remains largely unclear what the notions of reforming, 
widening, developing and partnering mean in practice. It also remains unclear how a 
transformed multilateral system would look like at large, what the modalities of more 
specific reform initiatives in certain areas or international organisations would be, and 
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how this transformation can be achieved in light of a “more connected, contested 
and complex” global environment.162  
 Furthermore, the EUGS’s bold call for transformation begs the question of 
feasibility, thus of how well-positioned the EU is to successfully advance such issues 
globally. Optimistically, it can be argued that the Lisbon Treaty has significantly 
strengthened the EU’s potential to act externally. After the EEAS’s complicated 
institutional merger and build-up, the Service and its inter-institutional and external 
relations are more consolidated by now. Additionally, Mogherini has enhanced the 
visibility and influence of the role of the HR/VP. While the EU still takes time to come up 
with common positions in international organisations, once it has a position, it tends to 
be strong and can mobilise the support of aligned and non-aligned countries next to 
the already 28 votes and voices of its own members.163 Despite falling short of the initial 
expectations, the UNGA Resolution to upgrade the EU’s status brought about tangible 
improvements and was an important learning process for the EEAS.164  
Nevertheless, there are many questions about the feasibility of the EUGS’s 
stated ambition to transform the multilateral system. Internally, the EU and its member 
states face a fundamental dilemma of collective action: They recognise that they 
benefit from their current over-representation in the multilateral system, but know that 
if the system fails to change, it risks being eroded. Yet, in most cases there is no internal 
consensus on the modalities of reform beyond technical issues, in particular 
concerning the UNSC.165 The lack of detail, strategy and vision of the 2012 Barroso-
Ashton Strategy illustrates this shortcoming.166 Instead, EU member states follow a 
“have cake and eat it too attitude” at the UN according to which they call for reform, 
but are unwilling to give up power.167 For Penttilä, this makes the EU in fact “one of the 
biggest obstacles to the reform of multilateral organisations”.168  
All this starkly contrasts with the EUGS’s aspiration to position the EU as a positive 
force for change of the multilateral system, which recognises the legitimate aspirations 
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of emerging powers and contributes meaningfully to global problem solving.169 In this 
sense, it is debatable whether the EUGS’s depiction of the “emergence of alternative 
groupings” as necessarily “detrimental” to the EU is strategically wise if the EU is to 
constructively engage and reach agreement on reform issues with emerging 
powers.170 Ujvari correctly points out that this approach is also “at odds with the EU’s 
former calls on the emerging powers to undertake increased responsibilities on the 
international stage”.171  
Externally, there are additional challenges undermining the EU’s potential to 
become a change agent for the transformation of the multilateral system as 
envisioned by the EUGS. For instance, legal issues of membership provisions in 
international organisations and conventions require the EU to lobby third parties for 
support and if necessary engage in legal arguments to improve the conditions for EU 
external representation. Yet, as demonstrated by the 2011 UNGA Resolution, these 
undertakings are time- and resource-consuming and stretch the EEAS’s limited 
capacity. Moreover, they are met with political resistance by third states (not only by 
emerging powers but also by ‘core partners’ such as the US).172  
Sometimes international organisations themselves are reluctant to allow for the 
enhancement of the EU’s status, too. For instance, the IMF at which the EUGS explicitly 
seeks to establish a unified Eurozone representation has in the past been sceptical 
about an upgrade arguing that it “remains a country-based institution and [that] the 
Eurozone countries remain individually accountable to fulfil their obligations to the 
Fund”.173 Through the example of the UN, Wouters, Chané and Odermatt illustrate the 
broader external challenge that “the gaps between the EU’s status in most UN bodies 
and its competences and priorities significantly hinder the effective representation of 
the Union”.174 
 Considering these internal and external challenges, Tocci confirms that in-
between the lines the EUGS’s bold call for change can be seen as an implicit wake-
up call to EU member states. This call seeks to convey that in order to preserve their 
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own influence and that of traditional multilateral institutions, EU member states need 
to get their act together.175 The EUGS implicitly suggests that this would entail giving 
up power as individual member states in international organisations, accommodating 
other actors’ interests – particularly those of emerging powers –, and rallying behind a 
more joined-up external representation.  
In sum, the EUGS seems to have gone as far as politically possible in calling for 
a progressive role of the EU in the inevitable transformation process of the multilateral 
system. Considering the above arguments, however, the challenges identified 
undermine the possibility for the EU to assume this role in practice. Due to the lack of 
agreement beyond the general direction, the EUGS’s progressive stance was most 
likely only possible at the expense of precision. Therefore, the successful 
implementation concerning the transformation of the multilateral system will hinge on 
enhanced consensus and shared understanding among member states.  
 
Innovation 3: From Selective Partnerships to Inclusive Partnering 
Centred around the notion of ‘partnering’, the EUGS recognises the EU’s declining 
relative influence and the limits of what it can achieve alone. Consequently, it makes 
an unprecedentedly clear case for stepping up the range and degree of cooperation 
for pursuing European interests, but also for solving global problems in a principled and 
pragmatic way. This includes partnering with non-state actors and overhauling the 
EU’s overly-institutionalised ‘strategic partnerships’.  
The strength of this approach is that it provides a strong narrative of the EU as 
“an agenda-shaper, a connector, coordinator and facilitator within a networked web 
of players”.176 Additionally, the EUGS’s approach of ‘partnering’ convincingly 
embraces the promotion of cooperative regional orders and a case-by-case process 
of selecting partners based on what they can contribute to a specific issue at hand. 
Thereby, the EUGS resolves some of the tensions that previously existed under the ESS 
between universalist ‘effective multilateralism’ on the one hand and promoting 
regionalisation and ‘strategic partnerships’ on the other hand.  
While convincing conceptually, the new approach of ‘partnering’ lacks 
substance. Apart from the case of cyber, in which the necessity to cooperate with the 
private sector is rather obvious, there is a lack of examples of and ideas about how 
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the EU can, for instance, meaningfully engage with non-state actors in global 
governance. This is illustrative of the fact that the EU has no prominent precedent and 
little experience in doing so.177 More strategic thinking, internal deliberations and 
institutional learning are required if the EUGS’s call for “more innovative forms of 
engagement” beyond “dialogue” and “support” is to become reality.178 
Moreover, devising and implementing strategies for such innovative 
engagement and maintaining ongoing relations with a larger and more diverse range 
of actors beyond states and traditional international organisations requires significant 
capacity and resources. Yet, the EEAS, whose staff number roughly corresponds to 
that of a medium-sized member state, has become a victim of its own success in terms 
of taking over more tasks from member states, albeit without corresponding increases 
in capacity and resources.179 As a result, on multilateral issues the EEAS’s focus is rather 
on keeping up with developments in traditional international organisations, particularly 
the UN,180 than on devising ambitious strategies on how to engage with a wider range 
of actors. While it was noted that the engagement with these actors also provides an 
opportunity to tap into their resources and use them as multipliers, it was simultaneously 
recognised that the EU, and particularly the EEAS, is currently not in a position to do 
so.181 This assessment significantly undermines the prospect of living up to the 
aspirations of the EUGS in the area of ‘partnering’. 
 
Conclusion 
In this paper I have analysed the EU’s approach towards multilateralism as presented 
in the 2016 EUGS and assessed in how far it differs from that of its predecessor, the 2003 
ESS. My analysis identified three major innovations. First, whereas in the ESS ‘effective 
multilateralism’ was both the means and end of the EU’s approach towards 
multilateralism, the EUGS adopts ‘effective global governance’ as a new means for 
achieving a rules-based global order. While comprising of ‘effective multilateralism’, 
‘effective global governance’ entails more than that and is a qualitatively different 
concept that renders the EU’s approach more flexible and issue-driven. Second, the 
EUGS goes beyond the ESS in terms of seeking to transform rather than preserve the 
multilateral system. It also sends an implicit wake-up call to EU member states urging 
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them to become part of that change to avoid the erosion of the system. Finally, the 
EUGS shifts the concept of partnership from a more selective and principled 
approach, based on universal multilateralism and selected ‘strategic partners’ in the 
ESS, towards a more inclusive notion of ‘partnering’ with a wider range of actors in a 
more pragmatic way.  
 These findings have important implications for the study of the EU in the 
multilateral system and as a foreign policy actor at large. To start with, the assumption 
that the EU unconditionally and primordially supports multilateral approaches has 
become questionable and needs to be reconsidered. The same applies to ‘effective 
multilateralism’ as a foreign policy doctrine. While ‘effective multilateralism’ is still an 
important foreign policy goal and remains the EU’s preferred approach, it is no longer 
perceived sufficient for advancing the EU’s interests and addressing global problems. 
Instead, a case-by-case approach that includes both formal and informal institutions 
as well as state and non-state actors is deemed necessary for the EU to prevail in a 
‘more connected, contested, and complex’ environment. Therefore, as argued 
above, ‘effective multilateralism’ no longer covers the entire “triangle of principles–
means–ends”, which according to Lazarou et al. constitutes a doctrine.182  
Moreover, the EUGS further side-lines the notion of ‘strategic partnerships’. This 
reflects the gradual recognition that the overly institutionalised way of trying to 
engage such partners failed to provide tangible outcomes. The EUGS implicitly 
confirms this assessment and lays the ground for reconceptualising the way in which 
the EU seeks to engage particularly with emerging powers under the broader notion 
of ‘partnering’. It is also the first time that an official EU foreign policy document grants 
extensive attention to non-state actors as important players in global governance.  
 For Legrand, the combination of soft power with the unprecedented emphasis 
on hard power makes the EUGS represent “a major shift in European foreign policy 
thinking”.183 This shift is embodied by ‘principled pragmatism’ as the new ‘meta-
narrative’ of the EU’s foreign policy. For Techau, the EUGS manages to “strike a fine 
balance between reduced and increased ambition”.184 Combined with the new 
meta-narrative, this is certainly one of the biggest achievements of the EUGS. This 
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balance is also directly reflected as such in the approach towards multilateralism, 
which recognises the limits of promoting universal multilateralism while at the same 
time stepping up the ambition in terms of seeking to transform the system and 
expanding partnerships.  
 While the overall narrative and the three innovations of the EUGS’s approach 
towards multilateralism are conceptually consistent and respond well to the changing 
global environment and the criticism of ‘effective multilateralism’, the analysis casts 
doubts upon the EU currently being in a strong position to transform the multilateral 
system and to engage in more ambitious, innovative and open partnerships. 
Concerning the ambition to transform the multilateral system, the challenges consist 
of an internal dilemma of collective action as well as external political resistance and 
legal hurdles. The ambition to engage in new forms of partnerships is undermined by 
capacity shortcomings. Additionally, both innovations suffer from a lack of substance 
and imagination, which are partly due to disagreements between member states. To 
be fair, the broad nature of a Global Strategy does not allow for much detail, and its 
vagueness can also serve as an advantage by granting it more flexibility in the 
implementation.185 Nevertheless, based on the insights derived from the interviews and 
other official documents, namely that this precision and ideas do not currently seem 
to exist outside the EUGS, further strategic thinking and planning, institutional learning, 
and research are all the more required.  
Based on these findings, the upcoming prioritised implementation of the EU’s 
new approach towards multilateralism should focus on forging consensus between EU 
member states on the modalities of reform of major international organisations, 
including the UNSC and the IFIs, and of the multilateral system at large. This includes 
the explicit recognition of the dilemma of giving up power versus risking to erode 
multilateral institutions and requires individual EU member states to rally behind a more 
joined-up external representation and accommodate the aspirations of emerging 
powers and developing countries. It also entails the necessity to develop a common, 
pro-active approach towards new multilateral institutions, such as the AIIB, to integrate 
rather than isolate them and encourage the adoption of established norms and 
procedures. Finally, European policy makers need to further conceptualise and put 
into practice innovative, inclusive and integrated ways of engaging with civil society 
and the private sector in global governance.   
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